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1. Introduction
Situations in which players’ preferences may change over time have been studied
by many authors. A partial list of relevant works includes Strotz [16], Pollak [13–15],
Phelps and Pollak [12], Von Weizsaecker [18], Blackorby et al. [4] and Hammond [9].
One consequence of introducing the possibility of changing preferences is that
decisions may not be consistent in the classical sense: decision makers may regret
having made certain choices in the past, even in situations of perfect information.
Ferreira et al. [6] propose to model these situations as extensive form games where
the different information sets of a given player define a set of agents of that player.
They consider only finite games and, after endowing each agent with a utility function
of his own, define recursively an equilibrium concept that takes into account two
important features. First the equilibrium has to be immune to the possibility of coali-
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tional deviations by agents of one player and, second, it has to satisfy a certain time
consistency, which requires that agents that appear earlier in time are considered first
and that further deviations cannot include agents that play earlier than the ones in the
first deviation. Agreements satisfying this requirement are called credible equilibria.
For many applications suggested in Ferreira et al., the assumption of perfect
recall may not be the natural one. In many game models, a player is not an individual.
It can be a state, a political party or any other organization. In such cases, it is natural
not only to assume that the different agents within this organization may have different
priorities, but to allow the possibility of imperfect recall, i.e., situations in which a
given agent does not know some actions taken in the past by other agents. In this
paper, we take up the challenge of providing an appropriate extension of credible
equilibria to these situations and to the case of an infinite number of players and
strategies.
There are many difficulties for such an extension. First, the definition cannot be
recursive because we no longer have a finite set of agents. Second, the lack of perfect
recall causes that an agent A may not know whether he is playing before or after agent
B, and at the same time, agent B may not know if she plays before or after A. This
again generates circularities in the definition and demands a clear discussion on the
notion of time consistency.
We address the problems of circularity by using ideas from the literature related
to the Theory of Social Situations, initiated by Greenberg [8]. One characteristic of
this theory is that, using a generalization of the stable sets defined by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [17], recursive definitions may be extended to infinite sets. The idea
is to divide the set of agreements into a stable partition of two sets, the good and the
bad, so that no element in the good set is dominated by any other good element, and
every element in the bad set is dominated by some good element. Of course, in our
case, the domination has to do with deviations by coalitions of agents of the same
player in some appropriate way.
Such a division may not be possible, as in the cases in which one has an infinite
space of strategies or a cyclical dominance relation. Our model has both. The second
best is then to find a weaker division on the set of agreements. A semistable partition
consists of three sets, the good, the bad and the ugly (Kahn and Mookherjee [10]),
where the good elements are dominated only by the bad ones, the bad ones are domi-
nated by the good ones and the ugly set is the complement of the union of the good
and the bad. This partition is always possible, and it is customary to choose the good
and the ugly sets to define the equilibrium.
However, we find that, at least in our case, some ugly elements may be uglier
than others. Since the ugly set may be very large (we provide an example with empty
good and bad sets), it seems only natural to explore the structure of this set. We do
this and propose a new relation on the ugly set based on classes of equivalence and a
domination relation on the quotient set. The idea is to identify elements within a cycle.
The partition on this ugly set may again not be a stable partition, but we show that the
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only cause for the existence of such an ugly—ugly set is if the quotient set of the
equivalence relation is infinite, since the new dominance relation is acyclical. Thus,
to accept this set is not as problematic as to accept the whole original ugly set. The
new definition then uses the original good set, the good—ugly and the ugly—ugly, and
gets rid of the bad—ugly and the original bad.
It is important to notice that, at this stage, credible equilibria are just a general-
ization of the basic concept of Nash equilibria. Refinements like sequential, perfect
and the like are still to be adjusted to the framework of changing preferences.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 is a brief presentation of the original
model in which credible equilibria are defined. Section 3 extends the definition of
credible equilibria to infinite games, but still assumes perfect recall. Section 4 drops
the perfect recall assumption and studies some of the difficulties that arise by so doing.
Preliminary versions of credible equilibria are provided. Section 5 studies the ugly set
and proposes a partition on this set. A final version of credible equilibrium is provided.
The techniques in this section may be useful for many other definitions within the
theory of social situations. Section 6 discusses existence and section 7 concludes.
2. Credible equilibria in finite games
The concept of credible equilibrium was introduced by Ferreira et al. [6] to handle
situations in which priorities change during the conflict. In this preliminary section,
we present their extensive-form game model and the solution concept, called credible
equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. This model is that of
a finite game with perfect recall. In the following sections, we drop these assumptions
and solve a number of conceptual and technical difficulties that arise in the process.
Let G = (T, P, U, C, p) be a game in extensive-form without payments at the
endpoints. Here, T is a tree, P = {P0, P1,…,Pn} is the players’ partition on the non-
final nodes of T; U = (U0,…,UN), where Ui = {ui.j}
ki
j=1 is the partition of Pi into
information sets; C = {C(ui.j)}i =1,…,n
j =1,…,ki  is a correspondence, where C(ui.j) is the set of
choices which are available to player i at information set ui. j; p = {p(u0j .)}j=1,…,k0 is a
vector-valued function, where p(u0j) is a probability distribution on chance moves at
u0j.
To complete the description of the model, we endow each agent i.j with a von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function hi.j, defined on lotteries over endpoints of T.
Formally, the game with utilities changing during the play is a six-tuple,
G = (T, P, U, C, p, h),
where T, P, U, C, p are as above, and h = (h1,…,hn), where, for an endpoint z, hi(z) =
(hi.1(z), hi.2(z),…,hi.ki(z)).
Notice that for each i, we obtained different agents i.j a  different information
sets ui.j of player i. The interpretation is as follows: at the begining of play, player i
believes that he will have the utility function hi.j whe he reaches information set ui.j.
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Throughout this section, we assume that the game is of perfect recall according
to the standard definition.
Definition 1.  A game form (T, P, U, C, p) is said to be of perfect recall if, for every i
(i = 1, 2,…,n) and every two information sets ui.j and ui .k of the same player i, if one
node y, y Î ui .k, comes after a choice c at ui.j, then every node x inui.k comes after the
same choice .
By Kuhn’s theorem [11], in the presence of perfect recall, one can restrict the
analysis to behavioral strategies.
Formally, a behavioral strategy si .j of agent i .j is a probability distribution over
the choices ci.j at ui.j. We denote by Si .j the set of these strategies. The set of behavioral
strategies for player i is Si = ´ j=1,…,ki  Si .j. An n-tuple of behavioral strategies i
s = (s1,…,sn) , and the set of these n-tuples is S = ´ i=1,…,n Si.
Let Q be a set of agents belonging to the same player. We denote by –Q the set
MnQ, where M is the set of all agents (not only of the same player). For a strategy s,
we denote by sQ the vector of strategies (sij)ij Î Q. For simplicity, we write (s– ij, s ¢ij ) to
express a deviation of agent i .j from s ¢ij . For s and s¢  in S, we write s¢ ´ij s iff hij (s¢ ) >
hij (s).
Now, we are ready for the definitions:
Definition 2.  We say that i.j plays after i.j0 if i .j = i .j0 or if every path from uij to the
root passes through ij0.
Definition 3.  Let G  be a game of perfect recall with utilities changing during the
play, let s be an -tuple of behavioral strategies, and let Q be a set of agents of player
i, containing an agent i.j0 and possibly some of i ’s agents that play after i.j0. A strategy
s¢Q is said to be a credible deviation from s, struck by agent i.j0 using Q, if
(i) s¢  ´ij0 s, where s¢  =  (s¢Q, s–Q).
(ii) s¢  ´ij (s¢–ij , sij ) for all i.j  Î Q, i.j ¹  i.j0.
(iii) No agent of i, whether in Q or not, that plays after i .j0 can strike a credible
deviation from s¢ .
Definition 4.  Let G  be a game of perfect recall with utilities changing during the
play. A behavioral strategy profile s is called a credible equilibrium (CrE) if no agent
can strike a credible deviation from it.
Remark 1.  These concepts are defined recursively. For further information concern-
ing these concepts, see Ferreira et al. [6].
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3. Extending credible equilibria to infinite games
In this section, we extend the definition of credible equilibria to games with an
infinite number of players, that is, N = {1, 2, 3,…}. For this purpose, we will follow
the approach in Asheim [2] where the notion introduced by von Neumann and
Morgenstern of abstract stable sets of appropriate abstract systems is used to extend
recursive definitions1) to the infinite case.
A von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract system (AS) is a pair (D, ´) where D
is an abstract set and ´ is a dominance relation. The notation f ´ d will be inter-
preted to mean that f dominates d. Let (D, ´) be an abstract system, and let f Î D.
The dominion of f, denoted by n( f ) , is the set of all elements of D that f dominates
according to the dominance relation ´:
1)The recursion being on the number of players, pure strategies, periods, etc.
  
n( f) = {d Î D: f ´ d},
n(F ) = <{n( f) :F , D}.
That is, an element d in D belongs to n(F) if it is dominated by some element
in F. A set F , D is a von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable set (ASS) for the
system (D, ´) if F = Dnn(F).
Let G  be a game with utilities changing during the play. Inspired by definition 4,
an abstract system (D, ´) is introduced. Let i be a player. For every agent, i.j, we
define Qi j to be the set of all agents of i hat play after i.j:
iff
(i) i.j plays after i .k.
(ii) hi.j(s) > hi.j( ˆ s).
(iii) hi.h(s) > hi.h( ˆ si.h( s– i.h) for all i.h Î Qi .j.
(iv) s– Qi j  = ˆ s– Qi j .
The next proposition relates the ASS of (D, ´) to the definition of credible
equilibrium for finite games of perfect recall with utilities changing during the play
and allows for a definition applicable to infinite games of perfect recall with utilities
changing during the play.
Denote by G sij the game obtained from G  by fixing the strategy of every agent of
every player according to s, except i.j and agents of player i that play after i.j. Note
that G sij is a one-person game, possibly with several agents, i.e., at the beginning of the
game, players think that that is the game agent i.j is facing, given that every agent
  
D = {(i.j,Qij ,s) : i.j Î Qij , Qij s Î ´ Si, j Î {1,¼ ,ki}}
i Î N
 ,
(i.j,Qij ,s) ´ (i.k,Qik, ˆ s}
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other than himself and his followers play s. Denote by i.j0 an agent of player i that
does not play after any other agent of that player.
Proposition 5.  Let K be an ASS of (D, ´). Then, for finite games (finite number of
agents and pure strategies) of perfect recall with utilities changing during the play, we
have that for all i.j, Qij  , Qi j and s Î ´ i=1,…,n Si , (i .j, Qij, s) Î K if and only if s is a
credible equilibrium in G .In particular, A = {s : 8i Î Nand 8i.j0 (i .j0, Qi j0, s) Î K}
is the set of credible equilibria of G .
Proof.  First, if for all i Î N, for all i .j and Qij , Qi j, then (i .j, Qij, s) Î K is not
dominated by any element in D, a d no agent of i that plays after i .j, say i.k, can
strike a credible deviation with ˆ s ´ik s and ˆ  s´ih (sih, ˆ s– ih). This is true for all i, i.j
and, in particular, for i.j ¹  i.k which, by definition 4, implies that is  credible
equilibrium.
To prove the converse, let s b  a credible equilibrium of G ,s  that no agent after
i.j can strike a credible deviation. If for some i.j and Qij , then (i .j, Qij , s) Ï K is
dominated by some element in K. This means that some agent that plays after i .j can
strike a credible deviation, i.e. $ i.k, Qik and s¢  =  (s¢Qik, s– Qik), such that (i.k, Qik, s¢ ) ´
(i .j, Qij , s). Since (i .k, Qik, s¢ ) Î K ,  s¢  is an equilibrium in G
s¢
i.k and, hence, s¢  is a
deviation from s struck by i.k. If i.k ¹  i.j, this contradicts the fact that s is  credible
equilibrium. If i.k = i.j, by theorem 5.1 in Ferreira et al. [6], there exists another
deviation s* struck by i.j such that s* i  a credible deviation from s. But then s is not
a credible equilibrium, which is a contradiction. u
The uniqueness of the abstract stable set is established in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6.  Let F and T be abstract stable sets of the abstract system (D, ´)
associated with a finite game, as defined above; then F = T.
Proof. Let {(i.jk, Qijk, sk)}k be an infinite sequence such that (i .jk+1, Qijk+1, sk+1) ´
(i .jk, Qijk, sk), for all k. By the finiteness of the set of agents and of the set of strategies
and because the dominance relation requires that ijk+1 play after ijk, we have that, in
the tail of the sequence, Qijk = Qijk+1 and ijk+1 = ijk. This tail is transitive. According
to corollary 4b in Arce and Kahn [1], this is a sufficient condition for the uniqueness
of the abstract stable set if it exists. u
Since the characterization of credible equilibria given in proposition 5 is not
based on recursion, it can be used to formulate a general definition of the concept,
covering both finite and infinite games.
Definition 7.  Consider a game of perfect recall with utilities changing during the
play and with an infinite or finite number of players and strategies. A sequence
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s = (s1, s2,…) is said to be a credible equilibrium of G  if and only if there is an abstract
stable set (ASS), K, for the associated system (D, ´) such that for all i Î N,  for all ij0
and for all Qij0 , Qij0, (i .j0, Qij0, s) Î K.
The abstract set K is interpreted as a social norm, where every point in K is
equally reasonable: no one dominates any other in the social norm and any point
outside the social norm is dominated by some element inside it.
A major difficulty in this approach is that when the abstract system (D, ´) is not
finite or ´  is cyclical2), stable sets may not exist. Kahn and Mookhejee [10] provide
examples of games with infinite action spaces where the stable set does not exist.
4. Imperfect recall
In this paper, we follow the standard ex ante view on strategy choice. This implies
that each agent evaluates the possible outcomes resulting from behavior and mixed
strategies before the game.
The perfect recall condition on information partitions is a basic assumption
in the study of extensive games. This condition expresses the idea that a player
remembers what he did and what he learned, and seems natural for rational players. In
our model, imperfect recall means that agents may or may not have the ability to
observe moves by other agents of the same player. Since agents play only at one
information set, the set of mixed strategies for that agent coincides with the set of
behavior strategies with and without the perfect recall assumption. The difference
that imperfect recall introduces in our model is on the relation play after.
Ferreira et al. [6] suggest some applications in which perfect recall may not be a
reasonable requirement. However, they do not pursue this idea further. In this section,
we study this extension and propose a notion of credible equilibrium for games without
perfect recall. As we will see, one consequence of not having perfect recall is that we
can no longer produce a recursive definition. When we try the ASS approach, some
difficulties arise since we cannot guarantee the existence of a unique stable set even
with a finite number of players. Hence, we use the more general concept of semi-
stability.
Another consequence of not assuming perfect recall has to do with the specifi-
cation of the permitted deviations. According to condition (iii) of definition 3 of the
original credible deviations, after a credible deviation no other agent after the one
who proposed the deviation should be able to find a new one. Now, this agent is not
required to play with positive probability according to the first deviation, yet if he can
strike a new one, that deviation was not credible. In the original framework (finiteness
and perfect recall), this did not represent any problem, since agents playing with
probability zero will never gain from a deviation as they can only instruct agents after
2)These cases could be an infinite game or imperfect recall.
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them, who, again, play with probability zero. Therefore, their actions will not change
the expected payoffs when evaluated at the beginning of the play. Without perfect
recall, this does not need to be the case. An agent that plays with probability zero may
instruct agents that, according to him, may play after him and that, by changing their
behavior, can make him play with positive probability. This is a very unnatural devia-
tion to be permitted. Hence, we have to prevent that possibility in the new definition.
We start by extending the relation pl y after to the case of imperfect recall and
by giving an example of how this relation may be cyclical.
Definition 8.  Let G  be a game with or without perfect recall and with utilities changing
during the play. We say that i .j plays after i.k according to strategy s if there exist a
path from the root of the game passing through y Î ui.k  and x Î ui.j,  and if both agents
play with positive probability if s is played.
Remark 2.  If one uses this new relation plays after ... according to strategy ... in
definition 3, the definition does not change as it refers to games of perfect recall.
The example in figure 1 illustrates how the lack of perfect recall may make the
relation play after cyclical. Observe that, according to the strategy in which every
agent randomizes between his strategies, agent 1.2 can play after 1.3 and agent 1.3
after 1.2, because their information sets cross each other. Notice also that, according
to strategy (R, L2, R3), agent 1.2 plays with probability zero. If we allowed this player
to strike a deviation with agents that may play after him, he could suggest to agent 1.3
to play l.3, thus making him play with positive probability. These are the kind of
situations we prevented in the definition.
Figure 1.
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Now we extend the definition of credible equilibrium to games of imperfect
recall, in which coalitions of players communicate prior to actual play and make non-
binding agreements on strategy choices. We wish to know which agreements are stable
in such environments.
For a strategy s, we denote by Qi j(s) the set of all agents of i that play after i.j
according to s. Inspired by definition 4 and by the above discussion, an abstract system
is introduced:
iff
(i) i.j plays after i .k according to ˆ s.
(ii) hi.j(s) > hi.j( ˆ s) .
(iii) hi.h(s) > hi.h( ˆ si .h,  s– i.h), for all i.h Î Q.
(iv) sQ = ˆ s– Q.
An element of D, which will be called an agreement, is a specification of the
moves to be taken by all members in the agreement, for a given list of moves for all
other players. Condition (i) allows the analysis of games with crossing information
sets as in figure 1. Only if agent i .j is reached with positive probability under ˆ s can
he strike a deviation from ˆ s. Condition (ii) states that i.j prefers the proposed devia-
tion s rather than the initial strategy profile ˆ s.C ndition (iii) implies that when i. , a
member of Q, comes to play, he prefers to comply with the deviation rather than with
the strategy ˆ s, given that all other agents in Q follow the deviation s. Note that condi-
tions (ii)–(iii) of the dominance relation impose requirements only on players who
play after i.j according to s.
Our objective is to determine whether an -player agreement is stable, i.e.
whether it is never dominated or is dominated only by an agreement that is dominated
by an agreement that is never dominated or … and so on.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern established sufficient conditions for the exist-
ence and uniqueness of the abstract stable set by considering properties of an acyclical
dominance relation on the abstract set. Unfortunately, the dominance relation ´´ is
not acyclical, therefore we cannot use those sufficient conditions to show existence of
the abstract stable set. This situation departs from the case of a finite number of players
and strategies and with an acyclical dominance relation, where there always exists a
unique partition of the abstract system into stable and non-stable sets.
Kahn and Mookerjee [10] provide an example of a game in which a stable
partition does not exist when considering an abstract system based on the concept of
coalition-proof equilibrium. The example involves an infinite set of strategies. For
this reason, these authors make a modification on the definition of stability. They
show that a weaker version of stable partitions, called semistable partitions, always
exists for arbitrary sets of objects and arbitrary dominance relations.
         
  
D = {(i.j,Q,s) ; i.j Î Q , Qi.j(s), s Î ´ i Si}, (1)
(i.j,Q, s) ´´ (i.k,H, ˆ s)
9
Definition 9.  Let (A, >>) be an abstract system. A trio of subsets {G, B, U} of A
form a semistable partition (SSP) of A if:
(1) B consists of all elements dominated by elements in G, i.e., x Î B iff $ x¢  Î G
such that x¢ > > x.
(2) G consists of all elements which, if they are dominated by some element, then
they are dominated by elements in B, i.e., x¢  Î G iff, whenever x >> x¢ , then x Î B.
(3) G > B = Æ  and U = An(G < B).
G is called the good set, B the bad set and U the ugly set.
Ideally, we would like to have a unique stable partition (i.e. U = Æ )because a
semistable partition that is not stable contains an ugly set, which makes the solution
concept ambiguous. Unfortunately, in our case, the abstract system (D, ´´) does not
admit a (´´ )-stable partition in general, as will be seen later on when studying the
example in figure 3. A semistable partition is a weaker concept than a stable partition
in the sense that the good and the bad sets do not exhaust the set of all agreements.
One result on a semistable partition (Arce and Kahn [1]) is that the ugly set contains
cycles or infinite sequences of agreements dominating one another, none of which is
dominated by a good agreement. We will study the ugly set of (D, ´´) in more detail
in the next sections. Before doing this, notice that semistable partitions may not be
unique. Our extensions of credible equilibria will be based on one interesting class of
them: The minimal semistable partition.
Definition 10.  A (´´)-semistable partition {G*(´´), B*(´´), U*(´´)} of D is
minimal if it satisfies G*(´´) , G(´´), B*(´´) , B(´´) and U*(´´) is the
complement of G* < B* for every semistable partition {G(´´), B(´´), U(´´)} of
D. These sets {G*, B*, U*} are called strictly good, strictly bad and strictly ugly,
respectively.
Minimal semistable partition can be constructed as follows (Kahn and
Mookherjee [10]). First define the sets G0
*  and B0
*:
  
G0 = {(ij,Q,s) Î D : not $ (ih, H, ˆ s) Î D : (ih,H, ˆ s)´´ (ij,Q,s)},
B0 = {(ij,Q,s) Î D : $ (ih,H, ˆ s) Î G0* : (ih,H, ˆ s )´´ (ij ,Q,s)}.
Next, inductively define Gk
*,  Bk
*
  with k = 1… ,
  
Gk
* = {(ij ,Q,s) Î D : if (ih, H, ˆ s) ´´ (ij,Q,s) then (ih, H, ˆ s) Î Bk - 1* },
Bk* = {(ij ,Q,s) Î D : $ (ih,H, ˆ s) Î Gk* : (ih,H, ˆ s)´´ (ij ,Q,s)}.










   And finally, define U* as the complement
of G* < B* in D.
         
10
Figure 2.
Consider the game in figure 2; (L1, L2) is not credible according to the original
definition because agent 1.1 can instruct himself and agent 1.2 to move (R1, R2). If
Once the semistable partition is defined, one can use the elements on the strictly
good set to define the equilibrium. The possible existence of a non-empty ugly set
opens the possibility of a stronger and weaker version of equilibrium.
Definition 11.  Let G  be a game of imperfect recall as defined above, with a finite or
infinite number of players and strategies, let (D, ´ ´) be an abstract system as defined
in (1), and let {G*, B*, U*} be a minimal semistable partition of D. A strategy s is said
to be a strongly-credible equilibrium of G  if for all i .j0 and Qij0 , Qij0, (ij0, Qij0, s) Î
G*(´´).
Our solution concept says that (ij0, Qij0, s) is stable if it is dominated only by
elements belonging to the strictly bad set. A weaker notion could also be defined as
follows:
Definition 12.  Let G , (D, ´ ´) and {G*, B*, U*} be defined as before. A strategy s
is said to be a weakly-credible equilibrium of G  if for all i .j0 and Qij0 , Qij0,
(ij0, Qij0, s) Î G
*(´´) < U*(´´).
The weaker solution says that an element of D is s able if it is not dominated by
any element in the strictly good set. These are standard ways of defining equilibria in
the literature of semistability; however, none of these definitions is entirely satis-
factory, first because the set G* may be empty and, second, because some ugly
elements may be uglier than others. The following section considers these points.
We end this section with an example of a game of imperfect recall in which the
dominance relation turns out to be acyclical. The example illustrates the different
implications of applying the original definition of credible equilibria and the ones just
proposed.
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agent 1.2 knew that agent 1.1 was moving right, he would certainly have chosen to
comply. But he does not know, and if he complies, then it behooves agent 1.1 to remain
at L1 so as to get 3. So, the deviation (R1, R2) is perhaps not safe.
We could conclude that the original definition of credible equilibria is not appro-
priate in this context, and certainly it was never intended to be. If we apply definition
2 or 3, we get the following chain of dominations:
(1.1, N, (L1, L2)) ` ` (1.1, N, (R1, R2)) ` ` (1.1, {1.1}, (L1, R2))
`` (1.2, {1.2}, (L1, L2)).
Notice that the last agreement is not dominated (it would need the participation
of 1.1 to go (R1, R2), but this is not possible as 1.1 does not play after 1.2).
Hence, ((1.1, N(L1, L2)), (1.1, {1.1}, (L1, R2)) are in the bad set and (1.1, N,
(R1, R2)), (1.2, {1.2}, (L1, L2)) are in the good set.
5. Cycles and equivalence classes
Consider the game in figure 3 and, for simplicity, consider only pure strategies.
The following relations can be easily checked. The agreements (1.2, N, (R2, L3))
and (1.3, N, (L2, R3)) form a cycle since they dominate each other. The agreement
(1.3, N, (R2, R3)) (with 0 < E < 13) is dominated by the two agreements in the cycle
before, and dominates the agreement (1.2, N, (L2, L3)). Finally, (1.2, N (L2, L3)) does
not dominate any other agreement and, therefore, is an element of the ugly set. This
suggests the division of the ugly set into a new partition where the elements in a cycle
Figure 3.
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that are not dominated by elements outside the cycle may be considered good. In this
section, we present such a division.
One result on the structure of ugly sets that will prove useful is the following
(Arce and Kahn [1]): Let (D, ´ ) be an abstract system, and {G, B, U} a semistable
partition on it; then, if U ¹  Æ , U contains a stack, i.e. an infinite sequence {xi}i such
that xi+1 > xi for all i. Sometimes U contains cycles, which are stacks with a finite
range. The strategy in this section consists in identifying the elements within a cycle
and in defining a new dominance relation on these.
Definition 13.  Let (A, ´ ) be an abstract system; a cycle in (A, ´ ) is a finite sequence
(xi)i=1,…,n with xi Î D that satisfies
x1 ´ x2 ´ … ´ x1.
Let {G, B, U} be a minimal semistable partition associated to (D, ´ ´). Suppose
that U is a non-empty set and that it contains, at least, one cycle. As we saw in the
previous example, in this set some ugly elements may be uglier than others. We will
use the methodology of stable sets to characterize these good–ugly elements in infinite
games without perfect recall. Therefore, the idea is to partition the ugly set into two
subsets, which can be denoted as the good–ugly and the bad–ugly, with the properties
of internal stability and external stability.
From the initial binary relation ´´, we define the following binary equivalence
relation:
(i .j, Q, s)  (i.h, H, ˆ s)
iff either (i .j, Q, s) = (i.h, H, ˆ s) or there exist sequences {(xi)i}, {(yi)i} in D such
that
  (i.j,Q,s) ´´ x1´´ xp´´ (i.h,H, ˆ s)´´ y1´´ yk´´ (i.j,Q,s).
Proposition 14.  The binary relation  on U defined above is an equivalence relation.
Proof.  It is trivial to show that the relation  is reflexive and symmetric.
To show transitivity, suppose that (i .j, Q, s)   (i .h, H, ˆ s) and (i.h, H, ˆ s) 
(i .k, K, s¢ ). This implies that either (i.j, Q, s) = (i .h, H, ˆ s) = (i .k, K, s¢ ) or
  (i.j,Q,s)´´ x1´´ xp´´ (i.h,H, ˆ s)´´ y1´´ yk´´ (i.j,Q, s)
and
  (i.h, H, ˆ s) ´´ ˆ x1´´ ˆ xp´´ (i.k, K, ¢s )´´ ˆ y1´´ ˆ yk´´ (i.h, H, ˆ s).
Then, (i.j, Q, s) ´ ´ x1 ´´ … (i .h, H, ˆ s)  ´ ´ ˆ x1 … ´´ (i.k, K, s¢ ). But this
implies that (i.j, Q, s)  (i .k, K, s¢ ). u
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We now consider the quotient set obtained after the equivalence classes of 
and define a domination relation on it.
Definition 15.  The classes of an equivalence relation º  on A are the collections
[a] = {x Î Anx º  a}. The collection {[a]}a Î A is denoted by A º  and called the
quotient set3) of A by º .
From the ugly set U and the initial relation ´´, (U, ´ ´), we define a new
abstract system,
3) The reader is referred to Potter [19, chap. 2] for a detailed study on equivalence relations and quotient
sets.
((U ), À),
where the abstract set is the quotient set of equivalence relation defined on the ugly
set, and the dominance relation is defined as follows: for [a], [b] Î (U ),
[a] À [b]
iff [a] ¹  [b] and there exist x Î [a], y Î [b] and a sequence {(xi)i} with xi Î U such that
x ´´ x1 ´´ … ´´ xp ´´ y.
For the general case, a stable partition on ((U ), À) may not exist. Consider
then a minimal semistable partition {GU, BU, UU}, and the following sets:
  GU* ( ) = {x Î U : [x] Î GU(À)} andUU* ( ) = {x Î U : [x] Î UU (À)},
With these elements, we can formulate a new extension of credible equilibrium that is
more satisfactory than definitions 2 and 3.
Definition 16.  Let G  be a game without perfect recall, with utilities changing during
the play and with a finite or infinite numbers of players. A strategy s is aid to be a
credible equilibrium of G  if for all i .j0 ÎN  and Qij0 , Qij0, (i .j0, Qij0, s) Î G(´´) <
G*U( ) < U
*
U( ).
At this point, it seems that one could again consider the possibility that some
elements in U*U are uglier than others and repeat the whole procedure for this set. The
good news is that this is not the case, since the set U*U  do s not contain cycles. This is
established in the next proposition.
Proposition 17.  Let ((U ), À) be as defined above; then À is acyclical on (U ).
Proof.  We use the following result: If a relation is asymmetric, irreflexive and
transitive, then it is acyclical. It is trivial to show that the relation À is irreflexive and
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asymmetric. To show transitivity, suppose that [a], [b], [c] Î (U ), with [a]  À [b]
and [b] À [c]. These classes are different and there exist x Î [a], y, y¢  Î [b] and z Î [c]
such that
x ´´ x1 ´´ … ´´ xp ´´ y,
y¢  ´´ y¢1 ´´ … ´´ y¢p ´´ z.  
Since either y = y¢  or y ´´ y1 … ´´ y¢  (because y, y¢  Î [b]), we have x ´´ … ´´ z,
which implies that [] À [c]. u
If the abstract set is finite and the binary relation is acyclical, then there exists a
unique stable partition. Since we have eliminated the possibility of cycles, the only
reason not to have a stable partition is if (U ) is not finite. One interesting question
for future research is to find conditions that guarantee the existence of a finite quotient
set (U ). It is clear that a finite ugly set generates a finite quotient set, but there
should be infinite ugly sets whose quotient sets are finite.
6. Existence
Not only in this work, but in all the literature using abstract stable sets, existence
theorems are very difficult to show, even in cases where counterexamples are also
hard to find. This seems the price to pay for being able to make non-recursive
definitions. This has not been a handicap for this methodology to be fruitful, providing
important insights into many aspects of hard problems in game theory, especially those
related to the stability of coalitional deviations.
Nevertheless, we can show the existence of an approximation of weakly credible
equilibria for finite games with imperfect recall. The approximation is on the line of
e -equilibria. Interestingly enough, in a very different setting, but still within the
methodology of abstract stable sets, and with a different kind of proof, Greenberg
et al. [20] were also able to prove only the existence of an e -conserv tive equilibrium.
Definition 18.  Define (D,´ e´ ) as (D, ´ ´) except that conditions (ii) and (iii) are
replaced with
(ii ¢ ) hi.j(s) > hi .j(ˆ s) – e .
(iii ¢ ) hi.h(s) > hi.h( ˆ si .h, s– i .h) – e , for all i .h in Qi.j.
Then define e -weakly credible equilibria as weakly credible equilibria in defini-
tion 12, replacing the dominance relation ´´ with ´ e´ . In words, an e -weakly
credible equilibrium is like the weakly credible except that agents do not deviate unless
they can win more than e  > 0. The next proposition shows that this new equilibrium
exists for an important class of games.
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Proposition 19.  There exist e -weakly credible equilibria.
The proof of this proposition is established as a corollary of proposition 21. But before
that, we need the following definition.
Definition 20.  Define G (d ) = (T, P, U, C, p, h, d ) as G  = (T, P, U, C, p, h), with the
only difference being that in G (d ), for every agent of every player, all pure strategies
must be chosen with a positive probability that is a multiple of d  > 0.
Remark 3.  For this definition to apply, it has to be the case that for every agent, the
number of strategies divided by d  is an integer. It is always possible to define G (d )
games when the original game is finite. Within this new class of games, we can apply
the different definitions of credible equilibria. Also notice that, for these games, if
one player plays after another according to a strategy, he also plays after him according
to any other strategy, so there is no need to make reference to the strategy.
Proposition 21.  Let G (d ) be a game as defined above. If it is finite then it has at least
one weakly credible equilibrium.
Proof.  Start with a strategy s. If it is not a weakly credible equilibrium, then there
exist (i .j0, Qi.j0, s) and (i.j, Qi.j, s ¢ ) such that (i .j, Qi .j, s¢ ) ´ ´ (i .j0, Qi .j0, s).
Now, if s¢  is not a weakly credible equilibrium, then we find a new dominating
deviation and so on. If at some point we reach a weakly credible equilibrium, we are
done. If not, we can construct a sequence of deviations. Since the number of agents
and strategies are finite, we must have the following cycle starting with some agent
i.h:
  
(i.h,Qi.h, ¢¢s ) ´´ (i.k,Qi.k, ¢ ¢ ¢s )´´´´ (i.h,Qi.h, ¢¢s ) ´´
                    ´´ (i. j,Qi.j , ¢s )´´ (i.j0,Qi .j0 ,s).
There are two possibilities. Either the elements in this cycle belong alternatively
to the good and the bad sets, or all of them belong to the ugly set. Consider, then, the
first possibility and the case in which (i . , Qi .h, s² ) is in the good set. Since all
strategies are completely mixed, all agents in the cycle play after each other according
to any strategy (recall the above remark). This means that if s²  is not  weakly credible
equilibrium, the only deviations that upset it are due to other players or to agents of i
that do not play after i.h. Fix the part of the strategy s²  for all the agents of i that play
after i .h, i.e., fix s²Qi h. With the existing deviation, we can repeat the same process
that we started with (i .j0, Qi.j0, s). Every time we do this, either we encounter a weakly
credible equilibrium or else we fix a strategy for a new set of agents. In the latter
situation, by the finiteness of the game, we have eventually fixed a strategy for every
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Figure 4.
agent. The strategy profile that is the result of these fixed strategies must be a weakly
credible equilibrium by construction (in fact, it would be a strongly credible equili-
brium, since it would belong to the good set) since no agent can find a deviation that
is not in the bad set. If (i h, Qi.h, s² ) is in the bad set, (i.k, Qi .k, s¢¢¢ ) is in the good set
and we can repeat the process to fix s¢¢¢Qi k. If the elements in the cycle are in the ugly
set, the process can be repeated directly with (i.h, Qi.h, s² ) and the final strategy
profile would be either in the good or in the ugly set, thus being a weakly credible
equilibrium. u
Proof of proposition 19.  Since payoffs are a continuous function of the probabilities
with which mixed strategies are chosen, for every e  th re exists a d small enough so
that every payoff that is the result of a strategy combination in G  is within the e -
neighborhood of a payoff in G (d ). Hence, the weakly credible equilibrium in G (d ) is
an e -weakly equilibrium in G . u
Remark 4.  This proof works with any positive e , but not with e  = 0. The reason is
twofold. First, as e  ®  `, the number of elements in the cycle also goes to infinity and
one cannot apply the argument and, second, the set of credible equilibria need not be
compact (see Ferreira et al. for an example).
We end the discussion of existence with an interesting observation. In the original
paper by Ferreira et al., the existence of credible equilibria was established as a conse-
quence of having as a subset the set of agent-perfect equilibria, which is non-empty.
When the assumption of perfect recall is dropped, in addition to all the difficulties we
address in this work, this relation does not hold in general. Figure 4 depicts a counter-
example.
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One can easily check that both agents moving right (dark arrows) is an agent-
perfect equilibrium. The same can be said if both agents move left (white arrows).
However, the first cannot be a credible equilibrium, since either agent can strike a
credible deviation by suggesting to go left.
7. Conclusions
We have extendend the definition of credible equilibria to infinite games and to
games with non-perfect recall. By doing so, we encounter a number of difficulties.
The possibility of an infinite set of agreements and the fact that players may play one
after the other in a cycle called for a non-recursive definition based on semistable
partitions. By studying the nature of the ugly set of this semistable partition, we were
able to propose a new division of the agreements that is more satisfactory than the
standard in the literature.
Other problems remain open. It is important to find necessary conditions to
guarantee a finite quotient set in the equivalence relation defined on the ugly set.
Other topics for further research include the extension of alternative definitions to
credible equilibria, such as optimistic credible equilibria and its variants, as defined
in Ferreira et al. [6]. Since all these definitions are extensions of the basic concept
of Nash equilibrium, and since the model of changing preferences is intrinsically
dynamic, it would be of interest to study extensions of refinements of Nash equilibria
to this model.
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